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INTRODUCTION

Tom Brady is arguably the best quarterback in the history of American
football.1 Although he was a mediocre college player, beginning his career at the
University of Michigan, 2 his sixteen-year professional career, which began on
Thanksgiving Day 2000,3 has been spectacular. Despite being a sixth-round draft
choice, 4 Brady has a record 25 post season wins and only 9 losses. 5 Brady has a
career total 456 touchdown passes (fourth all-time), 6 fifteen of which occurred
during Super Bowls. 7 He also has 50 touchdown passes in a season (second alltime)." He has two National Football League (NFL) most valuable player (MVP)
1.
11 Reasons Tom Brady Might Be the Greatest Quarterback Ever, CBSSports.com,
http://cbssports.com/nfl/photos/11-reasons-why-brady-might-be-the-greatest (last visited Sep. 28,
2016). This article has updated data used in this news story.
2.
Tom Brady, Biography.com http://www.biogmphy.com/people/tom-brady-259541" \1
"early-athletic-career" (last updated Feb. 6, 2017).
3.

Bob Hohler, Tom Brady 's Humble Beginnings Here Had Hints of Greatness, THE

BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2017, https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/patriots/2017/02/01/tombrady-humble-beginnings-here-had-hints-greatness/B7MOJs7WLvGeQS3rLTAAgK/story.html.
4.

Tom Brady, Biography.com, supra at note 3.

5.
Tom
Brady,
ProFootballReference.com,
http://www.pro-footballreference.com/players/B/BradTo00/gamelog/post/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
6.

NFL Passing Touchdowns CareerLeaders, ProFootballReference.com, http://www.pro-

football-reference.com/leaders/pass td career.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
7.

Jeremy Bergman,AtLeast 30RecordsSet or Tied in Super Bowl LI, Nat'l Football League

(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000783986/article/at-least-30-records-setor-tied-in-super-bowl-li (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
8.

NFL

Passing Touchdowns Single-Season Leaders, ProFootballReference.com,

DEFLA TEGA TE

2017

51

awards9 and a record four Super Bowl MVP awards. 0 He owns the Super Bowl
passing yards and single-game completions records, with 466 yards on 43
completed passes in Super Bowl LI," and has a career high 43 single-game
completions (he is tied for second all-time). 12 He has led the Patriots to a record
14 AFC Division titles.13 The Patriots have never had a losing season since Tom
Brady has been their starting quarterback. 14
Tom Brady elicits strong feelings of love from his fans, and equally strong
feelings of hatred from nonfans. These polarized feelings have facilitated divided
opinions about the Deflategate scandal; the strongest of which called for the
punishment of Tom Brady, the Patriots, and some Patriots' officials for allegedly
cheating in a playoff game. This article is not about the merits and demerits of
that case. This article instead explains why, regardless of the merits of that case,
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell failed to execute industrial due process and
industrial equal protection, to which Brady was entitled.
Part I of this Article provides factual background necessary for
understanding this case. This background includes: the procedural history of the
case, including the Pash/Wells investigation; the grievance-arbitration
proceedings; and the eventual court review of the arbitration proceedings. Part
II starts with a brief history of general labor arbitration. It then compares the
typical grievance-arbitration mechanism with the procedures found in the NFL
Player's Association's (NFLPA) collective-bargaining agreement. Special
attention is spent on the NFL-NFLPA's Article 46 procedures because those
procedures were invoked in the Deflategate arbitration. Deflategate is one
example of how the NFLPA's labor arbitration rules (specifically Article 46)
facilitates the immediate escalation of certain types of grievances to the highest
level of authority which may violate players' due process and rights to equal
protection.
Part III focuses on the en banc appellate review portion of the Deflategate
case. Part III A discusses the standards for obtaining en banc review in the courts

http://www. pro-football-reference.com/leaders/pass td singleseason.htn (last visited Mar. 9,
2017).
9.
AP NFL Most Valuable Player Winners, ProFootballReference.com, http://www.profootball-reference.com/awards/ap-nfl-mvp-award. hun (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
10.
Super BowlMost Valuable Player Winners, ProFootballReference.com, http://www.profootball-reference.com/awards/super-bowl-mvp-award.htn (last visited Mar. 9, 2017).
11.
Rob Goldberg, Tom Brady Breaks Super Bowl Single-Game Recordfor Passing Yards,
Completions, Bleacher Report (Feb. 5, 2017), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2691410-tombrady -breaks-super-bowl-single -game -record-for-passing-yards-completions.
12.
NFL Passes Completed Single Game Leaders, ProFootballReference.com,
http://www.pro-football-reference.com/leaders/pass cmpsinglegame.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2017).
13.

New

England

Patriots

Team

Records,

Leaders

and

League

Ranks,

ProFootballReference.com, http://www.pro-football-reference.com/teams/nwe/ (last visited Mar. 9,
2017).
14.
Id.
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of appeal. Part III B discusses the labor law principles necessary for resolving
Deflategate. This section focuses on the eponymous Steelworkers Trilogy - a
series of three grievance-arbitration cases involving the United Steelworkers
union decided on the same day over a half-century ago. From those cases, I
distill ten principles of labor arbitration, and three values underlying grievancearbitration, industrial peace, participation, and fairness. In Part III C, I detail the
Second Circuit's decision, and explain how the court's decision to uphold
Commissioner Goodell's arbitration decision conflicts with the Steelworkers
Trilogy.
I. DEFLATEGATE

A.

The Scandal: The Patriots'2015 AFC Championship Victory Is Tainted by
QuarterbackTom Brady's Use of UnderinflatedBalls During that Game'5

The New England Patriots entered the 2014-2015 playoff season as
American Football Conference (AFC) East Champions with a 12-4 regular
season record.16 After defeating the Baltimore Ravens in a close 35-31 game,
the Patriots proceeded to the AFC Championship Game. That game would
determine which team would advance to Super Bowl XLIX. On January 18,
2015, the Patriots played the Indianapolis Colts at the Patriots' home stadium,
Gillette Stadium, in Foxborough, Massachusetts, for the AFC title.17 The
weather ranged from overcast to mostly cloudy with some light rain; winds from
the Southeast ranged from 15 to nearly 20 miles per hour; the temperature fell
between 51o - 52o F. 18
During the second quarter, Colts linebacker D'Qwell Jackson intercepted a
pass thrown by Patriots' quarterback Tom Brady. Sensing that the ball was
underinflated, Jackson brought the ball to the sideline and confirmed that it was
below the allowed minimum pressure of 12.5 pounds per square inch. The Colts
informed NFL officials, who tested the game balls with two different gauges at

15.
The facts in this background section are taken primarily from the following sources:
Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d
Cir. 2016) (NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA II); Nat'l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat'l
Football League Players Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (NFL Mgmt. Council v.
NFLPA 1), rev'd, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016); See PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON
LLP, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING FOOTBALLS USED DURING THE AFC CHAMPIONSHIP
GAME ON JANUARY 18, 2015, p. 2 (written by T. Wells, B. Karp, L. Reisner), May 6, 2015,

hereinafter the Wells Report. (Joint Appendix II, p. 92).
16.
2014 NFL Standings & Team Stats, ProFootballReference.com, httt://www.rofob alrefere1e.com/ears/2014/ (last visited on May 8, 2017).
17.
Jeff Gray, AFC Championship 2015: Schedule, Game Time, and More for Colts vs.
Patriots, SBNation (Jan. 11, 2015), t://wvw.sbnationcornifi/2015/1/11/7529z07/2015-afc18.

East Foxboro M4 Hourly Weather Datafor January 18, 2015, FriendlyForecast.com,

h8:/0oww.friendyforecastcon/usa/awbive/arclve.12IMeion=MA&id=I 56489&date=201501
I 8000000&sort=hour (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).

DEFLA TEGA TE

2017

53

halftime. All four of the Colts balls tested within the permissible range between
12.5 and 13.5 psi on at least one of the gauges; all eleven of the Patriots balls
measured below 12.5 psi on both gauges.19 NFL officials inflated all game balls
to the appropriate pressure to start the second half of the game.
The teams entered the third quarter with the Patriots leading the Colts, 177. Tom Brady and the Patriots had a great second half The Patriots scored 21
points in the third quarter, 7 additional points in the fourth quarter, and shut out
the Colts in both quarters. 20 The Patriots defeated the Colts, 45-7, to advance to
the Super Bowl, where the Patriots ultimately defeated the Seattle Seahawks, 2824.21

B.
1.

Investigation of the Complaint

The Pash/Wells Investigation: The NFL Hires Outside Counsel To
Investigate; Counsel Concludes that PatriotsEquipment Officials
Tampered with Game Balls and that Brady Was GenerallyAware of the
Ball Tampering Scheme

The following week, the NFL retained the law firm, Paul, Weiss, Rilkind,
Wharton & Garrison to conduct an independent investigation into the alleged
improper ball tampering. Paul Weiss Attorney Theodore V. Wells, Jr. and NFL
Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeff Pash co-led the investigation.
The Wells Report, a 139-page document detailing the investigation's findigs,
was released on May 6, 2015.22 The report concluded that it was "more probable
than not" that two Patriots equipment officials, Jim McNally and John
Jastremski, had "participated in a deliberate effort to release air from Patriots
game balls after the balls were examined by the referee." 23 The report explained
that natural causes such as weather conditions could not completely account for
the change in ball pressure when measured before the game and when measured
at halftime. 24 Further, the investigation uncovered electronic communications in

19.
NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA H1, 820 F.3d 527, 532-33 (2d Cir. 2016); NFL Mgmt.
Council v. NFLPA 1, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 453-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
20.
Game
Center:
Play
by
Play,
Nat'l
Football
League,
(last visited Nov. 6, 2016).
21.
Jeff Gray, Super Bowl 2015 FinalScore for Patriotsvs. Seahawks: 3 Things We Learned
from
New
England's
28-24
Win,
SBNation,
Feb.
1,
2015,
http://www.sbnatioacominfiil/2015/2/1/7960971/sealiawks-patriots-2015-suer-bowl-xlix-resuiltsfinal-score.
22.
NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA II, 820 F.3d at 533; NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA I,
125 F. Supp. 3d at 453-54.
23.
See PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT
CONCERNING FOOTBALLS USED DURING THE AFC CHAMPIONSHIP GANIE ON JANUARY 18, 2015,

p.2 (written by T. Wells, B. Karp, L. Reisner), May 6, 2015, hereinafter the Wells Report. (Joint
Appendix II, p. 92)
24.
See Wells Report at 9-13. (Joint Appendix II, pp. 104-108)
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which McNally referred to himself as the "'deflator."' 25 According to the Wells
Report, shortly before the game started, McNally moved the balls from the locker
room to a single-toilet bathroom, locked the door, and used a needle to deflate
the game balls before bringing the deflated balls to the playing field.26
The Wells Report found that Brady's role in the ball-tampering scheme was
more attenuated. Although the Report concluded that Brady was "generally
aware of [McNally's and Jastremski's] inappropriate activities," it did not find
that Brady himself participated in or directed any activities related to ball
tampering. 27 The Report further observed that Brady's performance improved
after the balls were re-inflated, noting:
Brady's performance in the second half of the AFC Championship Gameafter the Patriots game balls were re-inflated-improved as compared to his
performance in the first half Specifically, in the first half, he completed 11 of
21 passes for 95 yards and one touchdown, and in the second half, he completed
12 of 14 passes for 131 yards and two touchdowns. 28
The Report made no findings, however, regarding the competitive effect
that the ball tampering had on the game.
2.

Remedy: NFL CommissionerRoger Goodell Appoints Executive Vice
President Troy Vincent to Determine DisciplinaryAction Based on the
Wells Report

NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell appointed NFL Executive Vice
President of Football Operations, Troy Vincent, 29 to discipline Brady. 30 In a
letter dated May 11, 2015, Vincent announced the disciplinary actions Brady
would face based on the findings of the Wells Report. 3 1 Vincent's letter stated:
"the [Wells Report] established that there is substantial and credible evidence to
conclude you were at least generally aware of the actions of the Patriots'
employees involved in the deflation of the footballs and that it was unlikely that
their actions were done without your knowledge." 32 Vincent also cited Brady's
"failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation, including by
refusing to produce any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.) despite
being offered extraordinary safeguards by the investigators to protect unrelated

25.
See Wells Report at 13. (Joint Appendix II, p. 108)
26.
See Wells Report at 56-62. (Joint Appendix II, pp. 151-157).
27.
See Wells Report at 122. (Joint Appendix II, p. 217).
28.
See Wells Report at 122, n.73. (Joint Appendix II, p. 217).
29.
NFL, THE NFL Ops TEAM, htp.11OperaiSn..com foot'ballos/the -nfops-eam/ (last
visited Nov. 6, 2016).
30.
Mike Reiss, NFLPA Asks Roger Goodell To Step Aside As Arbitratorin Tom Brady s
Appeal, ESPN, May 15, 2015, http://www.espn.com/boston/nfl/story/_/id/12891908/nflpa-asksroger-goodell-step-aside-arbitrator-new-england-patriots-quarterback-tom-brady-appeal.
31.
Letter from Executive Vice President Troy Vincent, Sr., to Tom Brady, p.1. (May 11,
2015), hereinafter May 11 Letter. JA 11329.
32.
Id.

2017

DEFLA TEGA TE

personal information." 33 Vincent concluded that Brady's conduct, as set forth in
the Wells Report, "constitute[s] conduct detrimental to the integrity of and public
confidence in the game of professional football. The integrity of the game is of
paramount importance to everyone in our League, and requires an unshakable
commitment to fairness and compliance with the playing rules." 34 Vincent
imposed a four-game suspension without pay.35
3.

Administrative Appeal andArbitration:The NFLPA Appealed;
Commissioner Goodell, Who Served as Appellate Arbitrator, Upheld the
Disciplineon Different Grounds

The NFLPA appealed Brady's discipline under the agreed-upon procedures
set forth in the NFL-NFLPA collective-bargaining agreement, which permits
appeals directly to the Commissioner. 36 Goodell appointed himself to serve as
the appellate arbitrator. 37 After a hearing, Goodell issued a 20-page affirmation
of the disciplinary decision. 38 Goodell affirmed the suspension on different
grounds that were not part of the Wells Report or the disciplinary order.
Specifically, Goodell affirmed the suspension by finding that Brady (1)
"participated in a scheme to tamper with the game balls after they had been
approved by the game officials for use in the AFC Championship Game" and (2)
"willfully obstructed the investigation by, among other things, affirmatively
arranging for destruction of his cellphone knowing that it contained potentially
relevant information that had been requested by the investigators." 39 Goodell
concluded that "this indisputably constitutes conduct detrimental to the integrity
of, and public confidence in, the game of professional football." 40
C.
1.

CourtReview

The NFL Management Council Asked the DistrictCourt to Confirm
Goodell's ArbitrationAward; the NFLPA Asked the Court to Vacate that
Award

The NFL Management Council filed a complaint under Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act 41 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York seeking to confirm the July 28 Arbitration

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
hereinafter
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2.
CBA, infra note 77 at art. 44, §§ 1(a), 2(a).
Id.
Roger Goodell, Final Decision on Article 46 Appeal of Tom Brady, Jul. 28, 2015,
"July 28 Arbitral Award."
Id. at 13.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
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Award. 42 The NFLPA filed an answer and counterclaim under LMRA Section
301 and Section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act 43 to vacate the July 28
Arbitration Award. 44 Judge Richard M. Berman vacated the arbitral award, 45
holding that the award was legally deficient because, among other things, Brady
received "inadequate notice" that the alleged misconduct was punishable by
suspension rather than fines. 46 In particular, the court concluded that the
collectively bargained penalty schedule-including the provision that "[first
offenses will result infines"-put Brady "on notice that equipment violations . .
could result in fines." 47 The court further held that the manner in which the
proceedings were conducted were fundamentally unfair.
2. The NFL Appealed the District Court's Order to the Second Circuit,
which Reversed the Lower Court andReinstatedthe ArbitralAward; the Second
Circuit denied the Patriots'and Brady's Petitionfor Rehearing
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2-1) reversed
the district court and reinstated the arbitral award. 48 The majority held that
Goodell did not exceed his authority as an appellate arbitrator by upholding the
suspension on new grounds, namely, Brady's destruction of his cell phone,
because "[n]othing in Article 46 [of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA)] limits the authority of the arbitrator to examine or reassess the factual
basis for a suspension." 49 The court added that although Commissioner Goodell
upheld the suspension on new grounds, he "did not increase the punishment as a
consequence of the destruction of the cell phone-the four game suspension was
not increased. Rather, the cell phone destruction merely provided further support
for the Commissioner's determination that Brady had failed to cooperate, and
served as the basis for an adverse inference as to his participation in the scheme
to deflate footballs." 50 The court denied the Patriots' and Brady's petition for
rehearing en banc.

42.
Compl., NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) Docket No. 1:15cv-05916-RMB-JCF (filed Jul. 28, 2015).
43.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2013).
44.
NFL Mgmt. Council, supra note 42 (Amended Answer and Counterclaim).
45.
NFLPA I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 453-54.
46.
Id. at 463.
47.
Id. at 468 (emphasis and bold in the original).
48.
NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA H1, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016).
49.
Id. at 541.
50.
Id.

2017

DEFLA TEGA TE

57

II. GRIEVANCE-ARBITRATION PRINCIPLES

A.

1.

A BriefHistory of the Rise of Grievance-Arbitrationas the Favored
Mechanismfor Resolving Labor Disputes

Problem One: Unions Lacked Legal Capacity, Which Led to Unjust Court
Verdicts

For over a century, U.S. unions could not sue or be sued in federal or state
court, because they did not have legal capacity. This resulted in several unjust
results, in which union members were held personally liable for the unlawful
actions of their unions.51 For example, in Loewe v. Lawlor,52 popularly known
as the Danbury Hatters case, the Supreme Court held that members of a local
union affiliated with the United Hatters Union (UHU) 53 violated the Sherman
Antitrust Act. 54 The violation occurred when the UHU leadership convinced
Loewe's retailers, wholesalers, and customers (i.e., third-party neutrals) to
boycott Loewe to put economic pressure on Loewe in hopes that the strike would
force it to recognize the UHU Local. Although the lower court dismissed the
case, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.55
This resulted in two subsequent trials. The judge directed a verdict for
Loewe in the first trial, sending the question of damages to the jury, which
assessed damages at $74,000; those damages trebled under the Sherman Act,
amounting to $232,240, including interest and costs. 56 On appeal, the Second
Circuit held that the court should have sent the liability question to the jury and
remanded for a new trial.57 The second trial resulted in a jury verdict for Loewe

51.
These results are particularly unjust for three reasons. First, although the union's
conduct was unlawful under the law of that time, in many instances, the union's conduct would be
lawful today. Second, even if we agree that the union's conduct should be unlawful and remains
unlawful under today's standards, individual workers (all of whom were members of the working
class) had no legal way of shielding themselves from personal liability. This is in distinct contrast
with the rule that we now think is fair, which rule limits liability to the extent of the person's
investment. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 CHI. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1985) (explaining that the "rule of limited liability means

that the investors in the corporation are not liable for more than the amount they invest," that
"[1]imited liability is not unique to corporations," and that the "instances of 'unlimited' liability are
few"). This treatment of unions contrasts with shareholders who generally are not liable for the
actions of the corporations in which they hold stock.
52.

Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).

53. The UHU was itself an affiliate of the American Federation of Labor (AFL).
54.
15 U.S.C. §1 (2013). The Sherman Antitrust Act made unlawful "combinations in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade." Although intended to break up as
anticompetitive trusts, monopolies or businesses with significant market power, the Act was soon
applied to union. This case represents the first time the Court applied the Shenan Act to labor
unions. See Ralph A. Newman, State Law in the FederalCourts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 277-78 (1946).
55.
208 U.S. 274.
56.
Lawlor v. Loewe, 187 F. 522, 523 (2d Cir. 1911).
57.
Id. at 527.
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in the amount of $252,130 (amount trebled, plus interest and costs), which the
Second Circuit affirmed.5 ' The case made its way, once again, to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed. 59 Union members were personally liable for the amount
awarded. Think about that. Workers attempting to improve their conditions
were forced to pay treble damages to the very employer that was exploiting them,
largely due to the unjust laws relating to union members.
2.

Problem Two: State Common Law Governs Contract-Enforcement,
Meaning that Enforcement of Collective-bargainingAgreements Was
Subject to Non-uniform Legal Principlesand PotentiallyInconsistent
Results

With regard to the substantive law, state law, rather than federal, typically
controls contract-enforcement cases. The common law of contract varied from
state to state; therefore, there were no uniform legal principles and the
enforceability of collective-bargaining agreements and the rights and remedies
available were potentially inconsistent.60
3.

Problem Three: Although Unions Helped Significantly in the War Effort
When They Supported Wartime Productionby EncouragingLabor Peace
through the Grievance Process, the UnamendedNLRA Encouraged
Conflict Resolution through Industrial War Such as Strikes

During World War II, unions and the grievance procedures, in particular,
became increasingly important.
Grievance procedures diminished work
stoppages, which was essential to sustain wartime production. Indeed, "[b]y
war's end . .. the basic structure of today's common arbitral system was in
place." 61 This structure included "a multistep grievance process which had the
effect of transferring authority from shop floor leaders to the union hierarchy." 62
Under this system, rather than basing rights "upon tradition or custom," they
were based "upon the contract and arbitral case law, a process paralleling the
'rule of law' in society."63 Equally important, and in direct contravention to the
by-then entrenched at-will default rule, "[d]ischarge or discipline could only be
for 'just cause. '64 Finally, the grievance system served as a substitute for selfhelp by forcing grievants, in most circumstances, to obey supervisory orders
while their grievance was being processed. 65
58.
Lawlorv. Loewe, 209 F. 721, 728 (2d Cir. 1913), aff'd, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).
59.
Lawlorv. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522, 537 (1915).
60.
See, e.g, Ralph A. Newman, The Closed Union and the Right to Work, 43 COLUM. L.
REv. 42, 45-49 (1943).
61.

James B. Atleson, Labor and the Wartime State: Labor Relations and Law During

World War 1170 (1998).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
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CongressEnacted the Taft-Hartley Act, in Part, To Resolve These
Problems

Congress, witnessing the importance of industrial peace for maintaining
production, remedied the union's legal status problem in 1947. Section 301(b)
provides that any "labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in
behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States." 66
Section 301, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 67 cured the union's common law problem of not being allowed to sue or
be sued. This put unions on par with the employer's legal status and limited
liability to the union's assets. Section 301 allowed unions to be treated on par
with corporations and eliminated the unjust results of cases such as Loewe v.
Lawlor.68 Section 301(b) also remedied the unjust results that occurred in cases
such as Loewe, by making judgments against unions only enforceable against the
institution and not its members. 69
Section 301(a) solved the common-law problem of substantive
inconsistency by conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts to hear
contract disputes. 70 Accordingly, this section makes collective-bargainingagreement disputes between employers and unions a federal question. This
provision thus requires federal courts to develop and apply a federal common
law of contract rules, fashioned from national labor law policy, only borrowing
from state rules when compatible with federal policy, and absorbing them into
the body of federal law governing collective-bargaining agreements.71 Although
Section 301 cases may be brought in either state or federal court, 72 a state court
deciding a case under Section 301 must apply the federal common law rather
than state law. 73

The Court developed several additional legal principles to clarify Section
301. For example, in Smith v. Evening News Association,74 the Court held that
individuals (as opposed to unions or employers) alleging injury from collective66.
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2012).
67.
See 353 US 448 (1957).
68.
Section 301(c) and (d)facilitate personal jurisdiction and service of process on unions.
69.
"Any money judgment against a labor organization ina district court of the United States
shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not
be enforceable against any individual member or his assets." 29 U.S.C. § 185(b).
70.
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees... ,orbetween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district
court, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
71.
See Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1484
(1959).
72.
See Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
73.
See Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen& Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1962) (applying federal common law in a case where the employer sued
for damages in state court after the union called a strike in violation of the collective-bargaining
agreement).
74.
371 U.S. 195, 200 (1962).
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bargaining-agreement violations may bring Section 301 suits. Shortly thereafter,
the Court held that, in individual actions under Section 301, absent a breach of
the union's duty of fair representation, the grievance machinery must be
exhausted before courts have jurisdiction to hear alleged contract violations.75
The overarching purpose of Section 301 is to facilitate industrial peace by
encouraging peaceful conflict resolution through the grievance-arbitration
mechanism. Section 301 thereby gives unions and workers the power to go to
court in three types of cases. First, it empowers courts to compel arbitration in
cases where the employer refuses to arbitrate the dispute because, it claims, the
collective-bargaining agreement has expired, was invalid from the outset, or does
not cover these employees. In such cases, the union can force the employer, via
Section 301 proceedings, to arbitrate after convincing the court that there is a
valid applicable collective-bargaining agreement. Second, it empowers courts to
enforce arbitration awards in cases where the employer refuses to comply with
that award, upon the union's application to enforce that award in a Section 301
lawsuit. Third, it empowers courts to review union breaches of collectivebargaining agreements.
C. Comparison of the Typical Grievance-ArbitrationClause and the
Grievance-ArbitrationMechanisms Employed in the NFL-NFLPA CBA
1.

The Typical Grievance-ArbitrationClause Requires Layered Review
Designed To Encourage Communication and Settlement at the Lowest
Level ofAuthority

Where private-sector workers are represented by a union, workplace
disputes are nearly always governed by the grievance-arbitration mechanism to
which the parties agreed under the collective-bargaining agreement. Because
these procedures are contractual, the precise mechanics of the grievance structure
vary based on the terms of the specific agreement. The typical grievancearbitration clause creates a multi-step procedure culminating in arbitration. These
multi-step contracts create layers of review designed to encourage
communication and settlement at the lowest level. In step one, the union presents
the grievance to the lowest level supervisor who has authority to settle the
dispute, usually the grievant's supervisor. If the parties are unable to resolve the
grievance at step one, the grievance may proceed to step two, where it is
presented to a manager, typically the step one supervisor's supervisor. Absent
resolution, this process may continue for one more step. In the final step, the
grievance is presented to a high-level manager such as the Director of Human
Resources. If the grievance remains unresolved at this point, the union (not
management and not the individual grievant) has the option of taking the

75.

See Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
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grievance to arbitration. 76
The collective-bargaining agreement between the NFL and the NFL
Players' Association (NFLPA) devotes several articles to the permitted
grievance mechanism.77 The main grievance procedures are described in Article
43, Non-injury Grievance,7' and Article 44, Injury Grievance. 79 Grievances
under these articles are filed and answered at step one. If those grievances are
not resolved to the grievant's satisfaction, they may move directly to arbitration.
Accordingly, these grievance articles provide for an abbreviated version of the
multi-stepped grievance process common in U.S. collective-bargaining
agreements.
2.

The Regular Grievance-ArbitrationClauses of the NFL-NFLPA CollectiveBargainingAgreement Were Not Applicable; the CommissionerInvoked
Article 46, which Immediately EscalatesDisputes over Alleged Conduct
Detrimentalto the Game ofFootballto the Highest Level ofAuthority

Articles 43 and 44, which work like an accelerated grievance process taking
a grievance from step one to arbitration, apply to all injury and noninjury
grievances. At first blush, that would seem to describe the entire universe of
grievances. But the parties here carved out a special procedure under Article 46
for grievances involving "conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the game of professional football." 0 There is no question that the
normal rules of labor law would apply to the accelerated grievance procedures
under Articles 43 and 44. It is also undisputed that the Deflategate dispute
triggered Article 46 grievance procedures rather than Articles 43 or 44. The
question becomes: Is there something special about labor disputes that involve
Article 46 conduct, such that well-settled labor principles should not apply in
these circumstances? The answer to that question is no. Relatedly, did the
Article 46 procedures as applied to the Deflategate dispute, violate those labor
principles? The answer to that question is yes.
D. Deflategate'sArticle 46Review
To understand how Article 46 procedures as applied to Deflategate violated
well-settled labor principles, it is necessary to understand how Article 46 works.
As explained above, Section 1(a) provides a different and "exclusive" procedure
76.

For a discussion of how the grievance-arbitration steps work, P. SECUNDA, A. LOFASO,

J. SLATER, & J. HIRSCH, MASTERING LABOR LAW 272-73 (2014).

77.
National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement (Aug. 4, 2011),
I ts//nil labor.files iv orduress com/2 10/ l1//collective bargaining-_aeecmentp2O11 _202.pdf
[hereinafter CBA]. The NFL Management Council and the NFLPA negotiated the agreement on
behalf of the NFL member football clubs and the players, respectively. See Complaint, NFLMC v.
NFLPA, No. 1:15-cv-05916-RMB, ¶¶ 3-4, filed Jul. 28, 2015; Joint Appendix vol. I, p. 29.
78.
CBA art. 43.
79.
CBA art. 44.
80.
CBA art. 46.1(a).
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by which "[a]ll disputes . .
involving action taken against a player by the
Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence
in, the game of professional football." 1 That process mandates that "the
Commissioner . . promptly send written notice of his action to the player, with
a copy to the NFLPA. Within three (3) business days following such written
notification, the player affected thereby, or the NFLPA with the player's
approval, may appeal in writing to the Commissioner." 8 2
Additionally, Section 2(a) of that Article permits the Commissioner to
"serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his
discretion." 8 3 Article 46 thereby provides for a special procedure in cases where
the Commissioner himself has disciplined a player "for conduct detrimental to
the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football." That
procedure requires the Commissioner to promptly send written notice of the
disciplinary action to the player with a copy to the NFLPA and grants the player
the right to appeal in writing to the Commissioner within three days of receipt of
that notice. The parties agree that the Commissioner himself may serve as
hearing officer.
Here, Commissioner Goodell disciplined Tom Brady in accordance with
Article 46's procedures. Indeed, Brady received more "process than was due"
under the Article insofar as Goodell ordered an independent investigation of the
circumstances surrounding Deflategate. After the investigation was completed,
Goodell's designee, Troy Vincent, sent Brady a disciplinary letter under the
Commissioner's authority announcing a four-game suspension. Thereafter,
Brady timely appealed that decision and Goodell appointed himself hearing
officer for the appeal. Goodell affirmed the suspension albeit on additional
grounds.
Now, we are left with a conundrum of understanding Brady's bases for
appeal. As discussed above, Brady and the NFLPA argued, among other things,
that Brady was denied sufficient notice that such a violation, essentially an
equipment violation, could result in a suspension without pay. While the district
court judge was convinced that Brady received "inadequate notice" that the
alleged misconduct was punishable by suspension rather than fines, 84 the
appellate court concluded that Goodell did not exceed his authority in affirming
this punishment or in bolstering the reasons for the punishment with additional
evidence. The answer to this question lies in (1) the standards for obtaining en
banc review and (2) whether the Second Circuit's opinion conflicted with
mandatory authority and/or whether the case presented a question of exceptional
importance. The Second Circuit's opinion conflicted with mandatory authority
and presented a question of exceptional importance.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
CBA art. 46, § 2(a).
NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 463.
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III. EN BANc REVIEW
A.

Standardsfor ObtainingEn Banc Review

En banc review is a special type of appellate court review, in which all the
circuit judges in active service may rehear a case. En banc review is disfavored
and is not ordered unless "[a] majority of the circuit judges who are in regular
active service and who are not disqualified ...
order that an appeal . . be . .
reheard by the court of appeals en banc." Appellate judges will not order such
review unless they are convinced that:
(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintam uniformity of
the court's decisions; or
5
(2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.8
To secure en banc review, the petitioner must show one of two
circumstances. First, that "the panel decision conflicts with a decision of the
United States Supreme Court or of the court to which the petition is addressed"8 6
The purpose here is to show that "consideration by the full court is therefore
necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the court's decisions.""' Second,
that "the proceeding involves one or more questions of exceptional
importance."" For example, "a petition may assert that a proceeding presents a
question of exceptional importance if it involves an issue on which the panel
decision conflicts with the authoritative decisions of other United States Courts
of Appeals that have addressed the issue."8 9
Brady, the NFLPA, and the amici who filed briefs in support of Brady
argued that the panel decision conflicted with mandatory authority and that the
case involved a question of exceptional importance.
To understand that
argument, we turn to the significant labor law principles that govern this case,
how the court applied them, how they were applied incorrectly, and why the
conflict with those cases creates a question of exceptional importance.
B.
1.

Labor Law PrinciplesNecessary to Resolving Deflategate90

The Steelworkers Trilogy
The

Steelworkers

Trilogy is a series of three cases

-

American

85.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
86.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(A).
87.
Id.
88.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(b)(1)(B).
89.
Id.
90.
See generally Brief of U.S. LaborLaw and Industrial Relations Professors as Amicus in
Support of Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA,

Docket Nos. 15-2801, 15-2805 (2d Cir. filed May 31, 2016) (citing Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
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Manufacturing Company,9 1 Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company,92 and
Enterprise Wheel and CarCorporation.93 The triad was decided on the same day
in 1960 and all three constituent cases involved the United Steelworkers of
America. 94 Through these cases, the Supreme Court determined the scope of an
arbitrator's power; that is, the authority vested in arbitrators to hear and decide
cases by interpreting, applying, and enforcing contractual language in collectivebargaining agreements.
a.

Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Company: In Section 301
Motion to CompelArbitration, Courts Are Limited to Determining
Whether the Dispute IsArbitrable

American ManufacturingCompany rendered the legal principle that limits
a court's ability to determine whether the case is substantively arbitrable in
Section 301 motion-to-compel-arbitration cases. By substantive arbitrability, the
court meant governed by the contract and capable of review by an arbitrator. In
that case, the parties agreed to a broad arbitration clause. The parties agreed to
arbitrate "any dispute" arising from the "meaning, interpretation and application"
of the agreement. 95 Employee Sparks, who had taken a leave of absence from
work resulting from an injury, sued the company for compensation benefits. This
case settled after Sparks' physician opined "that the injury had made him 25%
permanently partially disabled." 96 Shortly after Sparks returned to work, the
union filed a grievance demanding that Sparks be returned to his original job
based on his seniority with the company, in accordance with a collectivebargaining provision, "fully recognize[ing] the principle of seniority as a factor
in the selection of employees for [positions] where ability and efficiency are
97
equal."
When the employer refused to arbitrate the dispute, the union brought a
Section 301 suit to compel arbitration. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee dismissed the case, holding that the settlement

91.
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
92.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
93.
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
94.
See Harry H. Wellington, Judicial Review of the Promise to Arbitrate, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 471 (1962).
95.
The agreement provided:
'Any disputes, misunderstandings, differences or grievances arising between the parties as to
the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agreement . .
may be
submitted to the Board of Arbitration for decision. * * * 'The arbitrator may interpret this
agreement and apply it to the particular case under consideration but shall, however, have no
authority to add to, subtract from, or modify the terms of the agreement . . .'The decision of
the Board of Arbitration shall be final and conclusively binding upon both parties, and the
parties agree to observe and abide by same. * * *'
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 565 n1 (1960) (quoting the parties collective-bargaining agreement).
96.
Id. at 566 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97.
Id. at 565-66 n.3.
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estopped Sparks from seeking reinstatement on the basis of seniority. The Sixth
Circuit, affirming the district court, characterized the dispute as 'a frivolous,
patently baseless one, not subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining
agreement."'9 The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that, "the agreement is
to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those that a court may deem to
be meritorious." 99 Indeed, courts must compel arbitration of all cases that are
arbitrable (governed by the contract) regardless of the merits.
American Manufacturing Company embodies the legal principle that
reviewing courts "have no business weighing the merits of the grievance,
considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether
there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the
claim.""oo Rather, the court's function "is confined to ascertaining whether the
party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the
contract.""o' In this way, courts will not "deprive [the parties] of the arbitrator's
judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained
for."102

b.

Steelworkers v. Warrior and GulfNavigation Company: GrievanceArbitrationPromotes IndustrialPeace through IndustrialSelfgovernance

Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company reinforced the Court's holding in
American Manufacturing Company. Here, the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement contained a no-strike clause, a no-lockout provision, and a broad
grievance-arbitration clause. The CBA also contained a broad management
rights clause. 103 In particular, the parties agreed to resolve "differences [that]
98.
Id. at 566.
99.
Id. at 567.
100.
Id. at 568.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
The grievance-arbitration clause stated in pertinent part:
"Issues which conflict with any Federal statute in its application as established by Court procedure
or matters which are strictly afunction ofmanagement shall not be subject to arbitrationunder this
section.
"Should differences arise between the Company and the Union or its members employed by the
Company as to the meaning andapplicationofthe provisions ofthis Agreement, or should any local
trouble of any kind arise, there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differences but
an earnesteffort shall be made to settle such differences immediately in the following manner:

"A. For Maintenance Employees:
"First, between the aggrieved employees, and the Foreman involved;
"Second, between a member or members of the Grievance Committee designated by the Union, and
the Foreman and Master Mechanic.
"Fifth, if agreement has not been reached the matter shall be referredto an impartial umpire for

decision. The parties shall meet to decide on an umpire acceptable to both. If no agreement on
selection of an umpire is reached, the parties shall jointly petition the United States Conciliation
Service for suggestion of a list of umpires from which selection shall be made. The decision of the
umpire will be final."
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arise between the Company and the Union or its members employed by the
Company as to the meaning and application of the provisions of this Agreement"
through the grievance-arbitration machinery.104 Nonetheless, the parties also
agreed that, "matters which are strictly a function of management shall not be
subject to arbitration under this section." 105 A grievance arose over the
employer's practice of contracting out bargaining-unit work (work typically
done by workers represented by the union). The employer refused to settle the
grievance and refused the union's request for arbitration. In a Section 301 action
to compel arbitration, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Alabama dismissed the case holding that the parties' collective-bargaining
agreement did not "confide in an arbitrator the right to review the [employer's]
business judgment in contracting out work."1 06 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on
grounds that the union had failed to obtain a provision prohibiting contracting
out work during contract negotiations.107
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court developed the theory underpinning
labor arbitration. Unlike commercial arbitration, where arbitration serves as a
substitute for litigation, "[labor] arbitration is the substitute for industrial
strife.... [A]rbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements
is part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself"os The Court
further explained that a collective-bargaining agreement, which states the
parties' rights and duties, "is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to
govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate." 1 09 The
Court further explained that because the agreement "covers the whole
employment relationship," it establishes "a new common law-the common law
of a particular industry or of a particular plant." 1 o The Court thereby recognized
that a "collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government." 1
It contrasted the labor agreement with the typical
contractual relationships into which parties "voluntarily" enter. The Court
pointed out that, with regard to the labor agreement, the "choice is generally not
between entering or refusing to enter into a relationship .

.

. Rather it is between

having that relationship governed by an agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each

United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 576-77 (1960) (quoting the
parties collective -bargaining agreement) (emphasis added).
104.

Id. at 576-77.

105. Id.
106.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 168 F. Supp. 702, 705 (S.D.
Ala. 1958), aff'd, 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior& Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
107.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 269 F.2d 633, 636 (5th Cir.
1959), rev'dsub nom. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
108. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
109.
Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 578-79 (citing Harry Shulman Reason, Contract, and
Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1004-1005).

110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 580.
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and every matter subject to a temporary resolution dependent solely upon the
relative strength" of the parties. 112 Drawing upon the writings of Dean Shulman,
the Court added:
Because of the compulsion to reach agreement and the breadth of the
matters covered, as well as the need for a fairly concise and readable
instrument, the product of negotiations (the written document) is . . . 'a
compilation of diverse provisions: some provide objective criteria
almost automatically applicable; some provide more or less specific
standards which require reason and judgment in their application; and
some do little more than leave problems to future consideration with an
expression of hope and good faith.' . . . Gaps may be left to be filled in
by reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the various
shops covered by the agreement. Many of the specific practices which
underlie the agreement may be unknown, except in hazy form, even to
the negotiators. 113
The Court drew another contrast between commercial arbitration (which
the parties utilize when there is a breakdown in the parties' working relationship)
and labor arbitration when it recognized that "the grievance machinery under a
collective bargaining agreement is at the very heart of the system of industrial
self-government." 1 4 Labor arbitration is, the Court added, "the means of solving
the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems which
may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord
115
with the variant needs and desires of the parties."

In effect, labor arbitration is an extension of the collective-bargaining
process: "The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is . . a
vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining
agreement." 1 6 Labor arbitration when used correctly may strengthen the parties'
relationship, rather than serve as a mechanism for broken relationships, as is the
case in commercial arbitration.
c.

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Company: Arbitration
Awards Are Final and Binding; Post-arbitralCourtReview Is Limited
to Whether the ArbitrationAward Draws Its Essencefrom the
Contract

Enterprise Wheel and Car Company presented the question of court review
of the post-arbitration case. Here, the parties submitted a wrongful-discharge
dispute to arbitration. The arbitrator ordered the employer to reinstate the eleven
aggrieved employees to their former positions and awarded backpay, except for
112.
113.

Id.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 580-81 (citing Harry Shulman, Reason,

Contract, andLaw in LaborRelations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1005).

114.
115.
116.

Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 581.
Id.
Id.
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a ten-day suspension period, less amounts received for other employment.I 7 The
employer refused to abide by the arbitral award, resulting in this Section 301
action. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia ordered specific performance of the arbitration order. The court rejected
the employer's jurisdictional arguments. The court also rejected the employer's
argument that the award was invalid because (1) the award itself was indefinite
and incomplete and (2) the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering backpay
beyond the collective-bargaining agreement's expiration date. In rejecting the
arbitrator's authority argument, the court relied on Lincoln Mills,"' where the
Supreme Court held that federal courts must fashion the substantive law in
Section 301 cases "from the policy of our national labor laws." The District
Court explained that "[t]he arbitrator's decision requiring [the employer] to
reinstate employees and reimburse them for back pay past the termination date
of the contract is in keeping with the policy of our labor laws under the
[NLRA]."ll9 The Fourth Circuit modified the award by disallowing backpay
beyond the labor agreement's expiration date and voiding the arbitrator's order
of reinstatement. 120
The Supreme Court reversed, in pertinent part, thereby upholding the
arbitral award with one minor modification. Focusing on the finality and binding
nature of an arbitration order, the Court explained that "[t]he refusal of courts to
review the merits of an arbitration award is the proper approach to arbitration
under collective bargaining agreements. The federal policy of settling labor
disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the
merits of the awards." 1 2 1
The Court also explained the significant role that the arbitrator plays in
resolving these disputes:
[A]rbitrators under these collective agreements are indispensable
agencies in a continuous collective bargaining process. They sit to settle
disputes at the plant level-disputes that require for their solution
knowledge of the custom and practices of a particular factory or of a
particular industry as reflected in particular agreements. 122
The Court proceeded to describe limits on the arbitrator's role in
interpreting, applying, and enforcing the collective-bargaining agreement, noting
that the arbitration "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from

117.
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308, 309 (S.D.W. Va.
1958), modified, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd in part, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
118.
See 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
119.
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 168 F. Supp. 308, 313 (S.D.W. Va.
1958), modified, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959), rev'd in part, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
120.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1959),
rev'd in part, 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
121.
United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); see also
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
122.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 596.
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the collective bargaining agreement":
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in
order to reach a fair solution of a problem. This is especially true when
it comes to formulating remedies. There the need is for flexibility in
meeting a wide variety of situations. The draftsmen may never have
thought of what specific remedy should be awarded to meet a particular
contingency. Nevertheless, an arbitratoris confined to interpretation
and application of the collective bargainingagreement; he does not sit
to dispense his own brand of industrialjustice. He may of course look
for guidance from many sources, yet his awardis legitimate only so long
as it draws its essence from the collective bargainingagreement. When
the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts
have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award. 123
The Court modified the order, instructing the lower court to remand the case
to the arbitrator to liquidate the backpay award. The Court effectively affirmed
the district court's enforcement of the arbitral award as liquidated.
Enterprise Wheel and Car Company affirms an important principle set forth
in Lincoln Mills: "One of the rules embodied in this federal law of collectivebargaining agreements is that an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising under the
agreement is binding and enforceable by a decree for specific performance."124
Enterprise Wheel and CarCompany's significance goes well beyond its holding,
however, by decreeing the roles of the arbitrator and reviewing court, and the
relationship between the two. The arbitrator's role is "to interpret and apply the
collective bargaining agreement."1 25
hfulfilling this role, the arbitrator must
"bring his informed judgment to bear. . . to reach a fair solution" to a labor
"problem." 1 26 When the arbitrator fulfills this role faithfully, he or she becomes
an "indispensable agen[t] in a continuous collective bargaining process." 1 27 In
"settl[ing] disputes," the arbitrator must search for a "solution" using
"knowledge of the custom and practices of . .. a particular industry as reflected
in particular agreements." 1 28 While the reviewing court's power is confined, it
retains the power to void the arbitrator's decision where "his award" does not
"draw[] its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 1 29 Where the
arbitrator fails to faithfully discharge that obligation-which is to bring informed
judgment, industry-specific knowledge, and plant-level custom as reflected in
management-labor agreements in fashioning a solution to a labor dispute-

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
Cox, supra note 71, at 1484.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 596.
Id.
Id. at 597.
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Simply put,

the relationship between the reviewing court and the arbitrator is that of
watchdog; the court is there to ensure that the arbitrator has faithfully executed
his or her duty of trust with respect to all parties to the collective-bargaining
agreement. The watchdog must ensure that the arbitrator does not accept a
request for arbitration simply to "dispense his own brand of industrial justice."
2.

The Main Values Underlying Grievance-ArbitrationAre IndustrialPeace,
Participation,andFairness
a.

IndustrialPeace

The grievance mechanism is used to encourage industrial peace through an
inexpensive and speedy means for obtaining industrial justice. Indeed, industrial
peace is such an important statutory value that reviewing courts will read a nostrike clause into any collective-bargaining agreement that contamis a grievancearbitration mechanism. 13 1 In the courts' view, the agreement to arbitrate is a quid
pro quo for the no-strike clause. This means that a union must refrain from
striking over any grievable or arbitrable subject no matter what the employer
does, and the employer must arbitrate whatever dispute arises within the confines
of the grievance-arbitration clause-even if the grievance is frivolous. 132
The trade-off between grievance-arbitration and no-strike clauses cannot be
overstated. Essentially, our national labor policy, which grants all employees the
right to withdraw their labor, also allows unions to waive that right through
contract even in cases where the parties do not expressly agree to a no-strike
clause (so long as the disputes are grievable). This is true even though the right
to strike is recognized by the international community as a human right. 133 Thus,
under federal law, the right to strike is a collective right that can be exercised and

130.
Id.
131.
See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962) (observing that
a contrary view would be completely at odds with the basic policy of national labor legislation to
promote the arbitral process as a substitute for economic warfare").
132.
United Steelworkersv. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
133.
See European Social Charter of 1961 art. 6, openedfor signature Oct. 18, 1961, ETS
No.035 (recognizing the right to strike as an inherent part of "the effective exercise of the right to
bargain collectively"); Keith Ewing, The Right To Strike Is a Human Right, THE GUARDIAN, Mar.
26, 2010, at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/mar/26/ba-strikehuman-rights. Some experts, including the two ILO supervisory bodies, the ILO's tripartite
Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and its Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), have also derived the human right to strike from the
fundamental right of association found in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work, June 18, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1233; the ILO Convention Concerning Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention No. 87, July 9 1948, 68 U.N.T.S.
17; and the ILO Declaration of Philadelphia, May 10, 1944. But see Employers' Statement in the
Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference (June 4, 2012),
http://www.uscib.org/docs/2012_06_04_ioe clarifications-statement.pdf (contesting that the right
to strike is a fundamental human right).
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waived by a union. The union exerts discipline over the workforce by channeling
workplace strife through the grievance-arbitration machinery. The strike is an
economic weapon of last resort.
b.

ProceduralJustice: Justice as Participation

American Manufacturing Company instructs us in another policy behind
this bold quid pro quo; airing workplace grievances, even if frivolous, is
therapeutic. The therapeutic function of grieving serves as a valve that reduces
tension in the workplace before the pressure builds to such a point as to create
circumstances ripe for economic warfare. As Harvard Law Professor Frank
Michelman famously pointed out, "[s]uch procedures seem responsive to
demands for revelation and participation.They attach value to the individual's
being told why the agent is treating him unfavorably and to his having apartin
the decision." 34
Workers, like all people, not only have an interest in the outcome of a
dispute (to which they are a party), but also value the process by which the parties
arrive at that outcome. Whether a decision is perceived as fair will often depend
on who made the decision, under what criteria, and to what extent workers
themselves had a voice in resolving the dispute. This is especially true when the
resolution disfavors the worker. When workers can freely participate in a fair
process in which their voice can be heard by a neutral arbitrator, workers are
more likely to accept the arbitration results, even when the arbitral decision is
averse to their interests.
Our vision for labor arbitration "is largely based on the description of a nonarbitrary and fair process contained in the famous Holmes lecture by Yale Law
School Dean Harry Shulman." 35 Labor law compels employers to deal with
employees,

136

through their "[r]epresentatives designated or selected," 1

37

over

1 38

"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
This, has had
the following two effects. First, employees have the right to participate in
workplace determinations, a right secured by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act. 139 Second, society's acceptance of unions and collective
134.
See Frank I. Michelman, FormalandAssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process,
in 18 NOMOS, DuE PROCESS 126, 127 (Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1997)
(discussing informal procedures, not specifically grievance-arbitration).
135.
Brief of U.S. Labor Law and Industrial Relations Professors as Amicus in Support of
Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 2-3, NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFLPA, Nos.
15-2801, 15-2805 (2d Cir. May 31, 2016) (citing Steelworkersv. American Manufacturing Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); and Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law
in LaborRelations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999 (1955)).
136.
This duty emanates from the duty to bargain. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2012).
137.
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a).
138.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); see generally NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958).
139.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157. That right is also secured by the correlative duty on the
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bargaining has augmented "the employee's confidence and his sense of dignity
and importance; where previously there may have been submission, albeit
resentful, there is now self-assertion." 1 40
Arbitration, as an extension of collective bargaining, also plays an
important role in democratic societies. As Justice Louis Brandeis explained,
collective bargaining is "the means of establishing industrial democracy as the
essential condition of political democracy, the means of providing for the
workers' lives in industry the sense of worth, of freedom, and of participation
that democratic government promises them as citizens." 1 41
c.

CorrectiveJustice as Fairness

The right to participate in decision-making that affects one's work life is an
important aspect of industrial justice. 142 But arbitration also allows for corrective
justice through a fair procedure. The participants in the grievance process accept
the result not only because the process is fair but the decision is fair as well. And
the decision is fair because an experienced and neutral expert has listened to both
sides and formulated an opinion as to whether one of the parties acted in breach
of contract or otherwise acted in an unlawful manner.
3.

Summary of the LaborArbitration Principles Underlyingthe Steelworkers
Trilogy, its Forerunners, and its Progeny

In summary, the Steelworkers Trilogy, its forerunners, and its progeny
define the scope of an arbitrator's power in relation to a reviewing court's power.
Principle one: Section 301 creates a federal cause of action for breach of
collective-bargaining agreements. Although Section 301 law suits are primarily
breach of contract claims, courts hearing these cases must not apply state contract
law. Instead federal courts must develop and apply a federal common law of
contract rules fashioned from national labor law policy, only borrowing from
state rules where compatible with federal policy, and absorbing them into the
body of federal law governing collective-bargaining agreements. 143
Principle two: Arbitrators, not courts, are primarily responsible for
interpreting the collective-bargaining agreement and applying its terms to the
dispute presented.
Principle three: An agreement to arbitrate grievances under a collective-

employer's and the union's part to bargain in good faith with a view toward reaching an agreement.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d); see also Anne Marie Lofaso, Talking Is Worthwhile: The
Role of Employee Voice in Protecting, Enhancing, and Encouraging Individual Rights to Job
Security in a Collective System, 14 EMP. RTS. & EMPLOYER POL'Y J. 101, 116 (2010).

140.
141.

Shulman, supra note 135, at 1003.
Id. at 1002.

142.
See generally Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a FoundationalTheory of Workers'Rights:
The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2007).
143.
See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457; see also Cox, supra note 71, at 1484.
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Principle four: Courts are limited to determining whether a labor dispute is
substantively arbitrable. In making that determination, courts may not weigh the
merits of the grievance or they risk depriving the parties of what they bargained
for - the arbitrator's judgment. 145
Principle five: Labor arbitration is an extension of the collective-bargaining
process, which serves to avoid industrial strife, encourage industrial peace, and
strengthen the parties' relationship. 146
Principle six: The collective-bargaining agreement is itself "a system of
industrial self-government"1 47 between parties that have a pre-existing
relationship. That agreement "covers the whole employment relationship." 1 48
Principle seven: When an arbitrator interprets or applies a collectivebargaining agreement, he or she thereby creates a new common law - the law of
the shop - that serves as the shop's rule of law. 149
Principle eight: No contract can cover all eventualities. The grievancearbitration machinery serves the purpose of having a process for fair resolution
over disputes created, at least in part, by gaps in the agreement and unforeseeable
problems.

1s

Principle nine: The arbitrator is the person for whom the parties have
bargained to interpret those gaps and ambiguities in a fair manner, thereby giving
meaning to the collective agreement. He or she is an agent in the collectivebargaining process. In rendering a fair decision, the arbitrator must be neutral,
and draw upon his or her experience and expertise in labor relations, the
particular industry, and even the particular shop. 151
Principle ten: The court's review of the arbitrator's neutral, experienced,
and expert opinion is, therefore, limited to determining whether the arbitral
award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement" or whether
the arbitrator exceeded his or her authority by "dispens[ing] his own brand of
industrial justice."1 52

144.
(upholding
supra note
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 454; Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 599
district court order to enforce arbitration award by specific performance); see also Cox,
71, at 1484.
Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568.
Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 579 (citing Shulman, supra note 135, at 1004-05).
Warrior & Gulf 363 U.S. at 578-79.
Id. at 580-81 (citing Shulman, supra note 135, at 1005).
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
Id.
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C. En Banc Arguments Showing that the PanelDecision Conflicts with
Supreme Court Precedentand Involves a Question ofExceptional Importance
As discussed above, Deflategate is a grievance-arbitration case in which the
NFL requested the district court to enforce its Article 46 arbitral decision under
Section 301. At first blush, this seems like an easy case. After all, the
Commissioner took action against Tom Brady under Article 46, Section 1(a) of
the NFL-NFLPA collective-bargaining agreement, which provides, in relevant
part, as follows:
All disputes . .. involving action taken against a player by the
Commissioner for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public
confidence in, the game of professional football, will be processed
exclusively as follows .. . 153
Moreover, the parties expressly agreed that the Commissioner may "serve
as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his
discretion." 1 54 Here, once Tom Brady appealed his case, Commissioner Goodell
exercised his discretion in serving as the appellate hearing officer, that is, the
arbitrator.
The problem here is two-fold. First, the Commissioner lacked several
important characteristics of an arbitrator. In particular, the Commissioner was
not neutral. Second, the Commissioner failed to explain his decision in terms of
generally accepted principles of industrial due process and failed to address
arguments grounded in the collective-bargaining agreement. As discussed in the
amicus brief, the Commissioner's actions created a significant question of
national labor law. In particular, the amici argued that an agreement to arbitrate
labor disputes can never amount to an agreement "to an arbitrary process where
that arbitrator may transform an appellate proceeding into a trial de novo, ignore
generally accepted principles of industrial due process, and ignore arguments
grounded in the collective bargaining agreement ('CBA')."155 In the amici's
view, if courts were to "allow arbitrators to ignore [a] CBA's 'appellate'
limitations or the parties' arguments (and the probative CBA language cited in
support of those arguments), parties will no longer be able to trust arbitration as
a fundamentally fair process, thereby discouraging its use as a dispute-resolution
method that protects industrial peace." 1 56 According to the amici, this "may

153.
There is some dispute as to whether Goodell followed these "exclusive" procedures
insofar as he delegated his Article 46, Section 1(a) authority to discipline a player for conduct
detrimental to the integrity of the game of professional football to NFL Executive Vice President of
Football Operations, Troy Vincent. That question, which is essentially a question of contract
interpretation, while an appropriate issue for appellate review, does not meet the high standards for
enbanc review - namely a question of national significance or a conflict with mandatory authority.
Accordingly, that question is beyond the scope of this article.
154.
CBA art. 46, § 2(a).
155.
Brief for U.S. Labor Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, NFL Mgmt.
Council v. NFL Players Ass'n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-2801, 15-2805).
156. Id.
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destroy the very process that the Court wishes to protect - the peaceful resolution
of labor disputes through a non-arbitrary and fair proceeding."157
The compound question that the amicus brief presents may be broken down
into the following two questions:
1. Are the parties to a labor arbitration entitled to an arbitrator who exhibits
certain characteristics, namely, neutrality, expertise, and experience?
2. Are fundamental principles of industrial due process automatically
embedded in a collective-bargaining agreement such that where an arbitrator
ignores such principles he or she has essentially dispensed his or her "own brand
of industrial justice"?
These arguments are reviewed in turn.
Commissioner Goodell Lacked Essential Characteristicsof an Arbitrator
at least with Respect to Deflategate

-

1.

As discussed above, labor arbitration is an extension of the collectivebargaining process, which serves to avoid industrial strife, encourage industrial
peace, and strengthen the parties' relationship. To fulfill these policies and
values underlying labor arbitration, the arbitrator must be neutral, experienced,
and expert. These traits arise directly from the principles emanating from the
Steelworkers Trilogy. Insofar as the collective-bargaining agreement erects a
system of industrial self-government to cover an entire employment relationship,
the grievance-arbitration machinery is built to strengthen that relationship by
forcing the parties to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner.
Here, the NFL-NFLPA collective-bargaining agreement permits the
Commissioner to "serve as hearing officer in any [Article 46] appeal .

.

. at his

discretion."15 Contrary to the NFL's contention, which ultimately won the day,
that is not the same as the parties choosing Commissioner Goodell by agreement
to serve as the arbitrator in these types of cases. Rather they expressly bargained
for "his discretion" as to when to serve as the hearing officer. This agreement is
against a backdrop of discretion to which all grievance procedures are subject
based on the labor grievance-arbitration principles developed in the Section 301
context, chief among them, the Steelworkers Trilogy.
Simply put, the parties did not bargain for Commissioner Goodell. They
bargained for discretion in cases that question the integrity of the game of
football. Management often likes to bargain for "discretion" in making
decisions, thinking that discretion means unfettered or unreviewable decisionmaking. However, discretion is always constricted by the rule of law and
reasonableness standards. The NFL's interpretation of Article 46 as bargaining
for Goodell makes these important labor arbitration principles a lost triviality.
Article 46 requires Commissioner Goodell to use his discretion in deciding who
157.
158.

Id.
CBA art. 46, § 2(a).
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should hear Tom Brady's case. He needed to find a neutral arbitrator who would
draw upon his or her experience with the NFL and expertise in labor relations in
professional football to render a fair decision that would tend to create industrial
peace. Goodell could never be that person in this case because he had already
prejudged Brady as guilty. The conditions for deference to the arbitrator
neutrality, expertise, trust - simply do not hold here.
2.

FundamentalPrinciplesofIndustrialDue ProcessAre Partand Parcel of
all Labor Agreements such thatArbitrators Who Ignore Such Principles
Have EssentiallyDispensed Their Own Brand ofIndustrialJustice

As discussed above, the Steelworkers Trilogy placed a significant limitation
on the arbitrator's decisional authority. Namely, the arbitral award "is legitimate
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." 59
Reviewing courts should not vacate an arbitral award, where an arbitrator shows
how his or her decision fits within well-established standards for justice.
For discipline to be just, there must be a good reason for the discipline; a
legitimate managerial interest that is furthered; and procedural fairness. 160 The
time-tested just-cause standard has developed meaning over the years through its
application in thousands of specific cases. Arbitrators faced with applying a justcause standard "have access to a rich body of decisional law supported by arbitral
opinions." 1 6 1 Much of this jurisprudence pertains to the procedures that
management, seeking to discipline workers, must apply. Indeed, "the practical
significance of the essence standard in discipline cases has been to require
arbitrators to determine the meaning of contractual language by reference to the
established jurisprudence of penalties and infractions as applied in previous
cases." 1 62 Accordingly, as the amicus brief further noted: An arbitral decision
that follows the established arbitration precedence, "draws its essence from the
agreement. This standard is consistent with the basic policy behind the essence
standard. So long as the arbitrator is seeking to be consistent with the decisions
of other arbitrators or judges, he or she is not attempting to "'dispense his own
brand of industrial justice. "'163
All collective-bargaining agreements must be read with the background that
workers are entitled to industrial due process. At the very least, this means the
following: "actual or constructive notice of expected standards of conduct and
penalties for wrongful conduct"; a "decision based on facts, determined after an

159.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
160.
See Roger Abrams & Dennis Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee
Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L. J. 594, 594 (1985) ("[flew things are more significantto employees
than limitations on their employer's power to discipline or discharge them").
161.
Brief of U.S. Labor Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, NFL Mgmt.
Council v. NFLPA, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-2801, 15-2805), at 3.
162.
Id. at 4.
163.
Id.
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investigation that provides the employee an opportunity to state his case, with
union assistance if he desires it"; "the imposition of discipline in gradually
increasing degrees"; and "proof by management that just cause exists."1 64 The
employee is also entitled to industrial equal protection, which means that the
arbitrator must treat like cases alike. 165
Commissioner Goodell, a non-neutral arbitrator, failed to apply these wellestablished rules of fair process and equal protection. With respect to industrial
due process, although Goodell based his determination on an investigation, the
imposition of the specific penalty was unprecedented and non-gradual.
Moreover, Goodell failed to provide proof of cause for this penalty. In particular,
by upholding the suspension without good reasoning, Goodell analogized
Brady's conduct to taking performance-enhancing drugs. This permitted
Goodell to jump over contractually agreed-to lesser penalties in favor of
suspension, thereby violating the principle of gradual discipline.
Goodell also failed to provide Brady with industrial equal protection when
he equated ball deflation with drug use but never explained how drug use and
equipment violations constituted like cases. This analogy is unfair for at least
two reasons. First, although the NFLPA agreed to specific penalties for steroid
use as part of the collective-bargaining process, it had no voice in establishing
any such penalty for football deflation. By contrast, the NFLPA did have a voice
in establishing the penalty schedule, which Commissioner Goodell ignored.
Second, whereas performance-enhancing drug use often involves criminal law
violations, deflating football is not against the law, but a mere violation of game
rules. To meet equal protection standards, Goodell should have explained how
performance-enhancing drug use and this type of equipment violation both
constitute" conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public confidence in, the
game of professional football." 1 66 He did not; as the amicus brief concluded, "[i]t
is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his failure to do so comprises the fatal
arbitration error of seeking to impose his own brand of industrial justice." 1 67
CONCLUSION

As this article shows, the merits of Deflategate were not at issue at the en
banc stage of these proceedings. Rather, this case was about whether Tom Brady
received a fair process.

164.
See Abrams, supra note 160, at 612.
165.
Id.
166.
There is some dispute as to whether Goodell followed these "exclusive" procedures
insofar as he delegated his Article 46, Section 1(a) authority to discipline a player for conduct
detrimental to the integrity of the game of professional football to NFL Executive Vice President of
Football Operations, Troy Vincent. That question, which is essentially a question of contract
interpretation, while an appropriate issue for appellate review, does not meet the high standards for
enbanc review - namely a question of national significance or a conflict with mandatory authority.
Accordingly, that question is beyond the scope of this article.
167.
Amici Brief of U.S. Labor Law, supra note 161, at 5.
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Part III explains why Tom Brady did not receive a fair process. Simply put,
Commissioner Goodell should not have appointed himself to hear Brady's case
because of his previous involvement in the case. Goodell failed as a non-neutral
arbitrator as revealed by the language in his arbitration decision. There is,
however, a larger point here. The NFL-NFLPA has a major structural obstacle
to fair process, which is found in Article 46 itself That Article allows the
immediate escalation of certain types of grievances to the highest level of
authority. While the parties are at liberty to make such an agreement, it seems
that such an agreement is unwise. There are historically grounded reasons why
most grievance-arbitration clauses require layered review designed to encourage
open communication and settlement at the lowest level of authority. Now that
the Commissioner, as arbitrator and with court approval, has interpreted this
clause as an agreement that the Commissioner has nearly unfettered discretion to
hear these cases, the parties should consider changing that language in their next
round of negotiations.

